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Abstract 
The majority of sovereign nations have a formal credit rating from more than one credit rating 
agency in order to bridge the potential informational gap that goes with only one formal rating. 
This study investigates the behaviour of rating agencies to determine if the African sovereign 
ratings by the three major credit rating agencies are different and if their rating actions have 
any influence on each other. The lead-lag relationships between the agencies are investigated 
by making use of a method similar to the Granger causality test in an ordered probit pooled-
data and individual country time-series setting. The monthly rating changes for the three 
agencies were used for 12 African countries from 2009 to 2018. The results show that when 
general rating changes are taken into account, Moody’s follows Fitch in more instances than 
Fitch follows Moody’s. Furthermore, when upgrade and downgrade actions are taken into 
account, Standard and Poor’s leads Fitch during all downgrade periods and in some periods 
after a rating upgrade. It is also shown that Fitch leads Moody’s during all downgrade periods 
and in some periods after a rating upgrade. In terms of individual country results, for 7 of the 
12 countries there is no evidence of herding or habit behaviour between any of the rating pairs. 
Herding behaviour was identified between different pairs of rating agencies for Angola, Egypt, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Tunisia. Fitch exhibits habit behaviour for Mozambique, 
whereas Standard and Poor’s shows contrarian habit behaviour for that country. 
Keywords: Africa, sovereign credit ratings, leaders, followers, herding, habit 





Africa has a market of one billion consumers (World Bank, 2015). This translates into one 
billion potential customers. If that does not capture the attention of investors, it is doubtful 
anything will. More and more attention from the world’s investors has been cast on the 
countless investment opportunities of Africa. However, the African continent is not yet the 
foreign investment hub that it should be, because the right conditions are not always in place. 
The continent is plagued by difficulties such as Ebola, HIV/Aids, armed conflicts, corruption, 
poverty and droughts, all of which make investors uneasy. There is no doubt that these 
weaknesses create uncertainty and increased risk for potential African investors. 
 
Investors use sovereign credit ratings in order to make sound investment decisions (Ferri, 
2004). Sovereign credit ratings are an indication of the economic, financial and political state 
of affairs of an economy and signal to governments and international financial markets 
important information regarding a country’s development (Afonso, 2003). According to 
Afonso (2003:56), the specific significance of sovereign credit ratings “arises from the fact that 
national governments are by far the largest issuers on capital markets and also because those 
country ratings are seen as an indication of public and private sector issues.” 
 
In recent times the rating industry has been criticised for various reasons. According to 
Matousek and Stewart (2015), rating agencies were especially critiqued in the 2007/2008 
period because none of them could raise an alarm before the global financial crisis. 
Furthermore, Morgan (2002) contended that the three major rating agencies operate in an 
oligopolistic-type market. According to various authors (see for example Mathis, McAndrews 
& Rochet, 2009 and Bar-Isaac & Shapiro, 2013), due to the market conditions of this 
oligopolistic-type structure, agencies can easily become contented and worry less about 
upholding their long-term reputations. Other criticisms include conflicts of interest in agencies’ 
business processes, sub-standard communication and insufficient transparency (Duff & Einig, 
2009). Alsakka and apGwilym (2010b) held that the role and responsibilities of rating agencies 
in emerging sovereigns are even more difficult and challenging than in developed sovereigns. 
 
If a rating assignment does not reflect the true potential of a country, investors will not make 
optimal investment decisions, which will also be to the detriment of sovereigns (African 
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Development Bank, 2011). Unfortunately, this scenario is the reality of a myriad of African 
sovereigns. The quality of rated African countries is sometimes questionable if the 
disagreements between rating agencies are considered. This has a substantially negative 
influence on much-needed investment inflows to the continent. 
 
The credit rating industry is dominated by three major credit rating agencies, namely, Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services and Fitch Ratings. Most countries have a formal 
credit rating from more than one credit rating agency and this is true for African sovereigns 
that are rated as well. According to Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a), various reasons drive 
sovereigns to request more than one formal credit rating. Some entities believe there is 
additional value in having more than one rating (Ellis, 1998). Baker and Mansi (2002) hold 
that entities prefer multiple ratings to accommodate gaps in information across agencies. 
Issuers want to get the most out of their credit quality by obtaining optimal borrowing terms 
and therefore multiple evaluations make sense (Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010a). According to 
Pretorius and Botha (2016), various agencies take different determinants and weightings into 
account, therefore multiple ratings can be beneficial to a sovereign.  
 
When sovereigns are rated by more than one agency, the ratings of those agencies are not 
always the same. These disagreements over credit ratings are known as ‘split ratings’ and these 
dichotomous ratings could be an indication of potential future rating changes (Alsakka & 
apGwilym, 2010b). According to Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a), these differences could be 
ascribed to different methodologies used and different experiences of credit rating agencies. 
The question now arises that, if a specific rating agency decides to adjust a country’s current 
rating, does this influence the ratings of other rating agencies? According to Alsakka and 
apGwilym (2010a), rating agencies see rating changes by other agencies as a signal to review 
their own ratings. Furthermore, rating changes can be seen as a cost-effective method for 
another agency to ensure the accuracy of its own ratings (Güttler & Wahrenburg, 2007). The 
faster a credit rating agency acts after long-term changes in a sovereign’s creditworthiness, the 
more creditworthy an agency appears (Ellis, 1998). It is thus to an agency’s own benefit to 
adjust, when necessary, the rating of a sovereign as quickly as possible. 
 
According to Alsakka and apGwilym (2010b), split ratings are exceptionally common among 
sovereign ratings of emerging economies. This is due to the inherent lack of economic and 
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political stability, which in turn leads to increased volatility and uncertainty in these economies 
(Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010b). Africa in particular suffers from economic and political 
instability and therefore the behaviour of credit rating agencies is important for African 
sovereigns. The behaviour of rating agencies influences the accuracy of ratings as well as future 
rating changes. 
 
Most research on the lead-lag behaviour of rating agencies focuses on corporate ratings. 
Limited research has been done on the lead-lag behaviour of rating agencies on sovereign states 
and even less in terms of African countries. This study aims to add to the literature in the field. 
In contrast to Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a) and Matousek and Stewart (2015), this study 
will focus only on African sovereigns to analyse the influence of the three major rating agencies 
on each other for this group of emerging countries. According to Alsakka and apGwilym 
(2010a:2615), “Rating agencies have varying experience in different countries, and differ in 
the methodologies used in judging the creditworthiness of a borrower.” It would therefore be 
enlightening to investigate the behaviour of the major rating agencies when it comes to African 
sovereigns.  
 
The aim of this study is to answer the following questions: a) Are there clear leaders and 
followers in African sovereign credit rating markets?; b) Is there a distinguishable difference 
in the reaction of rating agencies if a specific rating agency upgrades a sovereign in contrast to 
downgrading a sovereign?; and c) Do rating agencies exhibit herding and habitual behaviour 
for African sovereigns as a group and individually? 
 
The study begins with a discussion of the literature on the lead-lag relationship between credit 
rating agencies for sovereign issuers. Thereafter, the data and methodology used in this study 
are highlighted. The fourth section discusses the empirical results and this is followed by 
concluding remarks. 
Literature review 
Agencies are always aware of other agencies’ ratings for specific sovereigns because they are 
publicly available. If there are disagreements among rating agencies, agencies have a choice to 
change their rating according to the other agency’s rating. According to Gomes (2015), if the 
rating of a specific agency signals the creditworthiness of a country, it might be optimal for 
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another rating agency to integrate this information into its own rating. This form of 
piggybacking can improve accuracy and save observing costs (Gomes, 2015). When a rating 
agency makes a rating change, the other agencies in the market can either do nothing or follow 
suit. During this process of rating transitions, leaders and followers can be identified. 
 
There is little research on the lead-lag relationship between credit rating agencies for 
sovereigns. According to Alsakka and apGwilym (2009), research is even scarcer for 
developing sovereigns due to small sample periods and the subsequent difficulty with 
modelling migrations, because of limited data observations. Therefore, most of the research 
covers interactions between rating agencies for corporate ratings (see for example Güttler and 
Wahrenburg, 2007 and Güttler, 2011). 
 
One of the earliest papers to consider disagreements among rating agencies regarding sovereign 
issues was, not surprisingly, by Cantor and Packer (1995). According to them, Moody’s and 
S&P assign different ratings more frequently to sovereign issuers than to corporate bonds when 
assigning ratings to sub-investment issuers. These disagreements can be ascribed to the 
inexperience of rating agencies in the rating of sovereign issuers and the difficulty of correctly 
gauging the political and economic stances that influence the creditworthiness of a country 
(Cantor & Packer, 1995). Today, more than 20 years later, inexperience no longer plays a 
significant role in the sovereign credit market, but it seems that it is still difficult to pinpoint 
the economic and political milieu of a country. 
 
Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a) investigated the lead-lag relationship across five rating 
agencies: Moody’s, S&P, Fitch, Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) and Japan Rating and 
Investment Information (R&I). All sovereigns rated by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, between 1994 
and 2009, and sovereigns rated by JCR and R&I, from 2000 to 2009, were included in the 
sample. They made use of ordered probit regressions for the daily data and a method similar to 
Granger causality (Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010a). Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a) found 
interdependence across rating agencies. It was found that Moody’s was the first mover in 
upgrade actions, but that S&P led Moody’s in downgrade actions (Alsakka & apGwilym, 
2010a). S&P was the most independent in rating actions (Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010a). The 
smaller Japanese agencies tend to follow the rating actions of the bigger firms with a time lag, 
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although there is some proof that Moody’s follows them during downgrades (Alsakka & 
apGwilym, 2010a). 
 
In a related study, Alsakka and apGwilym (2010b) rated heterogeneity in emerging economies. 
They made use of six credit rating agencies, the aforementioned five agencies used in Alsakka 
and apGwilym (2010a), as well as the Capital Intelligence (CI) agency. Annual observations 
from 2000 to 2008 of 49 emerging economies were included in the sample. Their ordered probit 
regression models showed that the greater the split rating between agencies, the higher the 
probability of potential rating changes in the future (Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010b). The rating 
disagreements of the smaller agencies with the major credit rating agencies have a significant 
influence on the rating dynamics of the smaller agencies (Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010b).     
 
Matousek and Stewart (2015) investigated the lead-lag relationship of sovereign credit ratings 
of various countries by looking at the herding behaviour of the three main rating agencies. 
Rating agencies exhibit herding behaviour when their rating assignments are influenced by 
other rating agencies instead of using their own judgement and information (Matousek & 
Stewart, 2015). Essentially herding should not be present in the sovereign credit rating market 
because agencies should yield independent ratings. In contrast to the study by Alsakka and 
apGwilym (2010a), Matousek and Stewart (2015) found evidence of heterogeneity in the lead-
lag relationship and therefore applied a Granger non-causality model to the individual country-
level data. Their results show that S&P have “the greatest reputational capital” because there 
is more herding towards this rating agency (Matousek & Stewart, 2015). Lastly, they also show 
that Moody’s is a follower for more countries than Fitch, which is in contrast to expectations.    
 
The literature on the lead-lag relationship between rating agencies in terms of sovereign issuers 
is limited. This study will contribute to the body of knowledge in the field by analysing the 
lead-lag relationship between S&P, Moody’s and Fitch while focusing on 12 African countries. 
This study determined how rating agencies react after a rating agency adjusted a rating. It also 
determined if there was a distinct difference in the behaviour of rating agencies during upgrades 
and downgrades. Lastly it also determined if there were clear leaders and followers in the rating 
markets of individual African sovereigns. The results were compared to the findings of research 








In this study, the monthly foreign currency ratings of 12 African sovereigns from S&P, Fitch 
and Moody’s from January 2009 to July 2018 were used. It was decided to use the period after 
the global financial crisis in order to eliminate any effects that the crisis could have had on lead 
and lag dynamics. The countries included in the study were chosen because they were rated by 
at least two of the three major ratings agencies from 2009 onwards. The countries included in 
the study are listed in Table 1. 
 
The source of the sovereign ratings data is Bloomberg (2018). The monthly dataset consists of 
3334 monthly observations for the 12 countries. S&P has 1104 observations for 11 countries, 
Moody’s has 892 observations for 11 countries and there are 1338 observations for 12 countries 
by Fitch. The credit ratings were transformed into a numerical scale by making use of a linear 
transformation as applied by Cantor and Packer (1996), with AAA assigned a value of 20 for 
S&P and Fitch through to CCC- which was assigned a 2 and all lower ratings being set to 1. 
For Moody’s, the rating category Aaa (which is comparable to the AAA category of S&P and 
Fitch) was assigned a value of 20 through to Caa3 which was assigned a 2 and all lower ratings 
also set to 1. The lower sets of ratings (below CCC- for S&P and Caa3 for Moody’s) are not 
comparable between rating agencies and are therefore grouped together. The end-of-month 
ratings were used in the analysis. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the monthly numerical ratings of African sovereigns for each 
agency. It can be seen that the distribution of the African sovereigns between the different 
ratings is mainly clustered around the middle to lower rating classes, that is, between 5 and 11. 
S&P has an average rating of B+ (a numerical rating of 7) and Fitch and Moody’s have an 
average rating of BB-/Ba3 (a numerical rating of 8 and thus one rating class higher than S&P). 
 
The frequencies of agreement and disagreement across pairs of rating agencies are presented 
in Table 2. Only countries that are rated by at least two rating agencies are considered. There 
are frequent disagreements between rating agencies. S&P and Moody’s have the highest 
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frequency of disagreement, at 53.24 percent. The disagreement rate between S&P and Fitch is 
50.63 percent. Fitch and Moody’s have the lowest disagreement ratio, at 47.98 percent.  
 
Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a) give three reasons for the high frequency of disagreements 
between rating agencies. First, rating agencies use different determinants when assigning credit 
ratings (see for example, Pretorius and Botha, 2016) and they allocate different weightings to 
these determinants. The second reason is highly applicable to the countries used in this study, 
namely the fact that rating agencies tend to disagree more on speculatively graded sovereigns. 
Lastly, some rating agencies are inclined to rate sovereigns in their home country more 
favourably than agencies in other regions. 
 
Table 3 depicts the distribution of monthly numerical rating notch changes between pairs of 
agencies. It can be seen that the majority of rating changes in the sample period are 
concentrated around one notch upgrade or downgrade. The number of downgrades exceeds the 
number of upgrades significantly for every case in the sample. This can be ascribed to the 
speculative nature of the countries included in the sample. It could also indicate the existence 
of asymmetries in sovereign credit rating cycles. According to Broto and Molina (2014), a 
whole credit cycle consists of a downgrade and an upgrade phase. The upgrade phase only 
entails an improvement of the credit rating and does not necessarily mean that the rating should 
return to the initial rating before the downgrade. The asymmetry in rating cycles refers to the 
dissimilar behaviour between upgrade and downgrade phases. Rating cycles are characterised 
by the trend that, when a sovereign is downgraded, it takes a longer period to recover from that 
downgrade (Broto & Molina, 2014). This asymmetry occurs because of an overreaction during 
downgrade phases in the economy. 
 
According to Broto and Molina (2014), asymmetry in the credit rating market can be ascribed 
to asymmetries that exist in the criteria that rating agencies use to determine their ratings during 
upgrade and downgrade phases. Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999), for example, showed that rating 
agencies tend to be exceptionally sensitive to fundamentals during downgrade phases (mainly 




Table 3 also shows the total percentage of changes in relation to the total number of 
observations in the sample. The low percentage of changes can be attributed to the monthly 
ratings that were used. Sovereign ratings tend to be more stable and do not change as frequently 
as other types of ratings (Cantor, Emery, Duggar & Cailleteau, 2008). Fitch shows the highest 
sovereign rating stability, followed by Moody’s and then S&P. The econometric framework to 
determine how these agencies follow each other in terms of sovereign rating assignment will 




Two types of econometric models were used to analyse the behaviour of rating agencies in 
terms of rating assignments. The first set of models all assumed country homogeneity and 
therefore use pooled data. Thereafter heterogeneity between countries were considered by 
making use of individual country data. The proposed models by Alsakka and apGwilym 
(2010a) were used in the pooled data setting and the model by Matousek and Stewart (2015) 
were utilised for both the pooled and individual country data. 
 
This study used a method similar to the Granger causality test in an ordered probit panel setting, 
as used by Güttler and Wahrenburg (2007) and Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a). The ordered 
response model was used because it allowed for a categorical dependent variable. The first set 
of models that were estimated for the pooled data were specified as follows (Alsakka & 
apGwilym, 2010a): 
 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐴𝐴 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖;   𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1)3ℎ=1        (1) 
 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐵𝐵 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐴𝐴 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖;   𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1)3ℎ=1        (2) 
 
where agency 𝐴𝐴 is the potential rating follower and agency 𝐵𝐵 is the potential rating leader in 
equation (1). In equation (2), agency 𝐵𝐵 is the potential rating follower and agency 𝐴𝐴 is the 
potential rating leader. ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 represents a rating change by agency 𝐴𝐴 in equation (1) and agency 
𝐵𝐵 in equation (2) for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 in month 𝑡𝑡. The coefficients of the model are represented by 
𝛽𝛽ℎ. The model distinguishes between four classes of rating changes, namely, ≤ -2 (downgrade 
by more than one notch), -1 (downgrade by one notch), 1 (upgrade by one notch) and ≥ 2 
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(upgrade by more than one notch). The independent variables are specified as: ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐹𝐹 , 
and ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑀𝑀 , which refer to a rating change for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 by agency 𝐵𝐵 in equation (2) and agency 
𝐴𝐴 in equation (1), where: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 refers to a rating change by S&P, 𝐹𝐹 a rating change by Fitch and 
𝑀𝑀 a rating change by Moody’s. Three time windows (ℎ) are specified as: ℎ = 1 for one month, 
ℎ = 2 for two to six months and ℎ = 3 for seven months to one year, before the rating change 
has been made by the dependent variable agency for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 in month 𝑡𝑡. 
 
The first set of models for the pooled data were also used to test if there was a difference in the 
lead-lag relationship between different agencies specifically with respect to upgrades and 
downgrades (Alsakka & apGwilym, 2010a): 
 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐴𝐴 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ1𝐷𝐷_𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐵𝐵 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ2𝐷𝐷_𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐵𝐵 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖;     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1)4ℎ=13ℎ=1     (3) 
 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐵𝐵 = ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ1𝐷𝐷_𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐴𝐴 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽ℎ2𝐷𝐷_𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐴𝐴 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖;     𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,1)4ℎ=13ℎ=1     (4) 
 
In these models, 𝐷𝐷_𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,ℎ is a dummy variable with the value of 1 when sovereign 𝑖𝑖 was 
upgraded by the potential leader agency. In 𝐷𝐷_𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,ℎ, the dummy variable is assigned the value 
of one when sovereign 𝑖𝑖 was downgraded by the potential leader agency and zero was used in 
all other cases. The same three time windows (ℎ) were used in the same way as in equations 
(1) and (2). 
 
The dependent variable in all models, ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ , is categorised in terms of the response classes 







−2 (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛ℎ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇1
−1 (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛ℎ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇1 < ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇2
1 (𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛ℎ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇2 < ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇3





   (5) 
where the thresholds (𝜇𝜇𝑚𝑚) and parameters (𝛽𝛽) will be estimated by making use of maximum 





The second set of models tested for herding behaviour between rating agencies by controlling 
for habit behaviour. These models were applied to the pooled and individual country data. The 
models are specified as follows (Matousek & Stewart, 2015): 
 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡       (6) 
 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐵𝐵 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1𝐵𝐵 + 𝑢𝑢1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡       (7) 
 
where ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐴𝐴 indicates the change in rating assignment by rating agency A for country 𝑖𝑖 in time 
period 𝑡𝑡 and ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐵𝐵 indicates the change in rating assignment by rating agency B for the same 
country and time period. According to Matousek and Stewart (2015), the results of regressions 
6 and 7 can be interpreted in terms of herding behaviour as follows: 
• If 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 > 0 or 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 > 0, herding behaviour happens. Therefore, one rating agency is 
following the previous assignment of the other rating agency when making its current 
assignment. 
• If 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 < 0 or 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 < 0, adverse herding happens. Therefore, one rating agency reverses 
the other agency’s previous assignment when making its current assignment. 
• If 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 = 0 or 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 = 0, no significant herding happens. 
Furthermore, according to Matousek and Steward (2015) the results of regressions 6 and 7 can 
be interpreted in terms of habit behaviour as follows: 
• If 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 > 0 or 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 > 0, trend following happens. Therefore, a rating agency follows its 
own previous assignment when making its current assignment. 
• If 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 < 0 or 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 < 0, contrarian rating assignment happens. Therefore, a rating agency 
reverses its own previous assignment when making its current assignment. 
• If 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 = 0 or 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 = 0, no habit behaviour happens. 






The results from the models specified in the econometric framework are presented in the 
following subsections. In the first subsection, the ordered probit estimations between pairs of 
credit rating agencies are illustrated in order to determine the potential leaders and followers 
between credit rating agencies. In these equations, the independent variables are the changes 
made by each rating agency over the respective time windows as specified in the previous 
section. In the second subsection, the ordered probit estimations are illustrated again, but in 
these models the changes made by the respective rating agencies are divided into upgrades and 
downgrades over the specified time windows. Pooled data was utilised in the first two 
subsections. In the third subsection the herding and habit behaviour of credit ratings is tested 
in terms of the pooled data as well as the country-specific data.  
 
Lead-lag relationships across pairs of agencies 
 
Results from the estimated models of equations (1) and (2) are represented in tables 4 to 6. 
Table 4 illustrates the lead-lag relationship between S&P and Fitch. It can be seen from Table 
4 that S&P follows Fitch during a rating change for 2 to 6 months after the rating change as 
well as for the 7 to 12 months after the change. The 2- to 6-month period is, however, only 
significant at the 10 percent level of significance whereas the 6- to 12-month period is 
significant at the one percent level of significance. The same is true for Fitch. When S&P makes 
a rating change, the same time periods are significant for Fitch. There is thus no clear leader or 
follower between S&P and Fitch. 
 
Table 5 illustrates the lead-lag relationship between S&P and Moody’s. As was the case with 
the data presented in Table 4, there is no distinguishable leader or follower between S&P and 
Moody’s. Both rating agencies seem to follow each other during the two- to six-month period 
after a rating change. 
 
Table 6 shows the lead-lag relationship between Fitch and Moody’s. Fitch follows Moody’s in 
the two- to six-month period after Moody’s initiates a rating change. The reverse is also true. 
Moody’s follows Fitch during the same time period mentioned. In addition, Moody’s also 
follows Fitch a month after a rating change. Moody’s therefore follows Fitch in more instances 
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than Fitch follows Moody’s. This result is rather surprising considering the strong market 
position of Moody’s (Duff & Einig, 2009). 
 
Lead-lag relationships across pairs of agencies in terms of upgrades and downgrades 
 
With this component, the same models that were discussed in the previous section between the 
pairs of rating agencies were repeated, but instead of making use of the overall rating changes 
of agencies, the rating changes were separated into downgrade and upgrade actions. Results 
from equations (3) and (4) are presented in tables 7 to 9.  
 
Table 7 illustrates the lead-lag relationships between S&P and Fitch in terms of upgrades and 
downgrades.   The table shows that S&P follows Fitch but only for downgrades and only for 
the 7- to 12-month period. On the other hand, Fitch follows S&P for all time periods for 
downgrades but also for the first month after an upgrade. This shows that S&P leads Fitch in 
more instances. 
 
Table 8 illustrates the lead-lag relationships between S&P and Moody’s with respect to 
upgrades and downgrades. There are no clear leaders or followers between S&P and Moody’s. 
Both agencies seem to follow each other for downgrades after months two to six after 
downgrade actions. 
 
Table 9 illustrates the lead-lag relationships between Fitch and Moody’s in terms of upgrades 
and downgrades. Fitch follow Moody’s at the 1-month as well as 6 to 12 months timeframes 
for downgrades while Moody’s follows Fitch on all downgrade timeframes as well as on the 2 
to 6 months period for upgrades. Fitch therefore leads Moody’s on more occasions.  
 
Herding and Habit Behaviour across Pairs of Agencies 
 
The models for equations (6) and (7) are presented in tables 10 to 13. Table 10 illustrates the 
results for the pooled data in terms of herding and habit behaviour. It shows that the herding 
coefficient is significant and positive for two pairs of rating agencies. Moody’s therefore 
follows Fitch’s ratings and S&P follows Moody’s ratings. Fitch leads in terms of Moody’s 
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whereas Moody’s leads in terms of S&P. Research by Matousek and Stewart (2015) discovered 
bi-directional Granger-causality between the pairs of the three major rating agencies. Thus, no 
clear leaders or followers were identified. 
 
The habit coefficient is positive and significant for two of the equations: on Fitch’s 
autoregressive coefficient when Moody’s is the other agency and on Fitch’s autoregressive 
coefficient when S&P is the other agency. Therefore, Fitch is influenced by its own previous 
rating assignments. The same habit trend between Fitch and Moody’s was discovered in the 
study by Matousek and Stewart (2015). In addition, there are also two cases where the habit 
coefficient is significant but negative. There is a negative and significant habit coefficient for 
S&P when Moody’s and Fitch are the other agencies respectively. This suggests that S&P 
exhibits contrarian habit behaviour and therefore tends to reverse its own past rating when 
making its current assignment. 
 
The models for the pooled data across all countries might exhibit heterogeneity of the lead or 
lag relationship across countries that is not obvious in the pooled regression. Therefore, the 
individual country time-series ordered probit regression were estimated as well. In Table 11 
the results for the individual country pairings for S&P and Fitch are presented. For Egypt and 
Mozambique, the herding coefficient is significant and positive when Fitch is the dependent 
variable. Fitch exhibits herding behaviour towards S&P. There are no countries where the 
herding coefficient is significant when S&P is the dependent variable. The habit coefficient is 
significant for Mozambique for both cases when Fitch and S&P are the dependent variables 
respectively. When Fitch is the dependent variable the coefficient is positive whereas when 
S&P is the dependent variable the coefficient is negative. Fitch thus exhibits habit behaviour 
for Mozambique and S&P displays contrarian habit behaviour for that country.  
 
Table 12 reports results for the S&P and Moody’s pairing. There is only one country (Egypt) 
with a positive and significant herding coefficient when Moody’s is the dependent variable. 
Moody’s current rating follows the previous period’s rating assignment by S&P for Egypt. 
Furthermore, there are three countries (Angola, Egypt and South Africa) with a positive and 
significant herding coefficient when S&P is the dependent variable. S&P current rating follows 
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the previous period’s rating assignment by Moody’s for the three countries. The results suggest 
that there is bidirectional Granger-causality between the agencies for Egypt and it might also 
indicate that there is a change in leadership through time for these countries. Mozambique is 
again the only country where the habit coefficient is significant but this time the coefficient is 
negative. This occurs when S&P is the dependent variable. The result shows that when S&P 
makes an assignment, it tends to reverse its own past rating. 
 
Table 13 illustrates these models for the Fitch and Moody’s pairing. For three countries 
(Angola, Egypt and Tunisia) there is a positive and significant herding coefficient when 
Moody’s is the dependent variable. This indicates that Moody’s current rating follows last 
period’s rating assignment by Fitch for the countries mentioned. Moody’s exhibits herding 
behaviour towards Fitch. There is only one country where the habit coefficient is significant 
when Fitch is the dependent variable, namely, Mozambique. The positive relationship indicates 
that Fitch exhibits habit behaviour by following its own past rating in making its current rating 
assignment for Mozambique. The herding and habit coefficient confirms the independence of 
Fitch for the rating assignment of Mozambique. 
 
In summary, of the individual country pairing results it can be said that for 7 of the 12 countries 
(Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia) that there is no evidence of 
herding or habit behaviour between any of the rating pairs. There is not a clear rating leader or 
follower in the rating assignment of Angola; Moody’s tends to follow Fitch whereas S&P 
follows Moody’s. Herding behaviour is identified between different pairs of agencies for 
Egypt. Moody’s tends to follow Fitch and Fitch tends to follow S&P. Furthermore, there is 
bidirectional causality between Moody’s and Standard and Poor. For Mozambique, herding 
behaviour is identified because Fitch tends to follow S&P. Also, Fitch tends to follow its own 
past rating in making its current assignment (this is true when Fitch is paired with Moody’s 
and S&P). Remarkably S&P displays contrarian habit behaviour when paired with Moody’s 
and Fitch respectively for Mozambique. The results also show that S&P follows Moody’s in 
the rating assignments of South Africa. Lastly, Moody’s follows Fitch’s previous rating during 
the current rating assignment for Tunisia. In summary, Table 14 condenses these findings of 





The purpose of this study was to investigate the lead-lag dynamics as well as the herd and habit 
behaviour between the three major credit rating agencies—S&P, Fitch and Moody’s—among 
sovereign issuers on the African continent. The findings show that although there is not always 
a clear leader or follower between S&P and Fitch, that S&P tends to lead Fitch especially 
during downgrades and after the first month following an upgrade. However, S&P follows 
Fitch 7 to 12 months after a downgrade. Furthermore, Fitch herds towards S&P when it comes 
to Egypt and Mozambique and at the same time Fitch also demonstrates habit behaviour when 
it comes to Mozambique. S&P shows contrarian habit behaviour, especially for Mozambique. 
According to Matousek and Stewart (2015), when herding behaviour is identified for some 
countries, it could be an indication of overestimated rating assignments and that rating agencies 
may be trying to enhance their reputational capital. It could also be indicative of inferior 
knowledge in terms of specific countries (like Egypt and Mozambique for Fitch). 
 
The results for S&P and Moody’s are mixed. Although there is in general no clear leader or 
follower between the two rating agencies, S&P herds towards Moody’ especially in terms of 
Angola, Egypt and South Africa. Bidirectional Granger-causality exists between the two rating 
agencies in terms of Egypt. S&P again reveals contrarian habit behaviour for Mozambique. 
The findings regarding S&P are in contrast to Matousek and Stewart (2015) because it was 
concluded in their study that herding is generally exhibited towards S&P ratings, due to that 
agency possessing the greatest reputational capital. The results from this study could point to 
the notion that S&P, and perhaps the other agencies, have not yet established reputational 
capital in Africa. This could be due to the uncertain political and economic landscape in Africa 
and the fact that not all African countries have ratings.  
 
Lastly, the results for Fitch and Moody’s are more clear-cut. In most instances Moody’s follows 
Fitch and therefore Fitch leads Moody’s. This is true for the month after a rating change has 
occurred, during downgrades at all periods (although Fitch follows Moody’s during 1 month 
and 7 to 12 months after a rating change), as well as 2 to 6 months after an upgrade. Moody’s 
herds towards Fitch in terms of Angola, Egypt and Tunisia. Fitch also demonstrates habit 
behaviour in terms of Mozambique. The results for Fitch and Moody’s correspond with the 
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findings of Matousek and Stewart (2015), indicating that Fitch leads Moody’s. This is in 
contrast to expectations since Fitch is a smaller, newer rating agency.  
 
The evidence does not support the research by Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a) that S&P is 
most independent in its rating actions. The results show that none of the rating agencies is the 
leader for all countries. This could be because rating agencies might have different levels of 
expertise for different countries at various times. However, the results do suggest that Fitch is 
the leader for more countries than the other two rating agencies. This finding is quite surprising 
because Fitch is considered as the rating agency with the least reputational capital. 
 
The evidence shows that Moody’s follows Fitch. Seeing that Moody’s is the largest rating 
agency in the world, their focus on smaller economies could be questionable. This also 
corresponds to the research by Alsakka and apGwilym (2010a), which concluded that Moody’s 
tends to follow smaller rating agencies.  
 
The findings of this paper have implications for rating assignments, since all three major credit 
rating agencies use robust quantitative data analyses as well as qualitative evaluations when 
assigning ratings to sovereigns. The question arises, should herding and habit behaviour then 
exist in the ratings of these agencies? This leads to another question, whether rating agencies 
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Table 1. Countries included in the study classified according to rating agency 
Countries S&P Moody’s Fitch 
Angola X X X 
Egypt X X X 
Gabon X X X 
Ghana X X X 
Mozambique X X X 
Namibia  X X 
Nigeria X X X 
Rwanda X  X 
South Africa X X X 
Tunisia X X X 
Uganda X X X 
Zambia X X X 
Source: Bloomberg (2018) 
 
Table 2: Agreement/Disagreement across rating agencies on African sovereign ratings 
Agencies No of countries Full sample Agreements Disagreements 
S&P and Fitch 11 1104 49.37% 50.63% 
S&P and Moody's 10 725 46.76% 53.24% 
Fitch and Moody's 11 892 52.02% 47.98% 
 Source: Bloomberg (2018) 
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Table 3: Distribution of monthly rating changes 
Agencies Number of countries 
Upgrades Downgrades 
Total changes % of Total amount of observations 1 notch More than 1 notch Total 1 notch More than 1 notch Total 
S&P 
11 
5 1 6 27 5 32 38 3.40 
Fitch 5 0 5 17 3 20 25 2.27 
S&P 
10 
3 1 4 24 5 32 37 3.10 
Moody's 5 0 5 27 2 29 34 2.85 
Fitch 
11 
3 0 3 20 3 23 26 2.36 
Moody's 4 0 4 31 3 34 38 3.45 





Table 4: The lead-lag relationship between S&P and Fitch, ordered probit models 
a) S&P as rating follower, Fitch as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME %  
∆ Rating by Fitch h=1  0.3893  0.1876  -0.4527   
∆ Rating by Fitch h=2  0.2254 * 0.0946  -0.2621   
∆ Rating by Fitch h=3   0.3196 *** 0.0092   -0.3717   
             
Pseudo R-squared  0.0347         
p (LR)   0.0048           
             
Observations   960           
          
b) Fitch as rating follower, S&P as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
∆ Rating by S&P h=1  0.2610  0.2869  -0.1333   
∆ Rating by S&P h=2  0.4375 *** 0.0030  -0.2235   
∆ Rating by S&P h=3   0.4272 *** 0.0023   -0.2182   
             
Pseudo R-squared  0.0800         
p (LR)   0.0001           
             
Observations   950           
*, **, *** 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance, respectively Data Source: Bloomberg (2018) 
Table 4a) and 4b) report the results of the ordered probit estimation of Equations (1) and (2) respectively using 
the sovereign credit ratings of S&P and Fitch for selected African countries. The dependent variables are 
respectively ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝑆𝑆&𝑆𝑆 and ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ  referring to a SCR change by S&P (Fitch) for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 at month 𝑡𝑡. Four 
different classes of rating changes are employed, namely ≤ -2 (downgrade by more than one notch), -1 (downgrade 
by one notch), 1 (upgrade by one notch) and ≥ 2 (upgrade by more than one notch). The independent variables 
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ and ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝑆𝑆&𝑆𝑆 refer to a rating change for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 by Fitch (S&P). Three time windows (ℎ) are specified 
as: ℎ = 1 for one month, ℎ = 2 for two to six months and ℎ = 3 for seven months to one year, before the rating 
change has been made by S&P (Fitch) for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 in month 𝑡𝑡. The marginal effect percentages (ME%) are 
also reported for the coefficients. This approach was followed in Table 5 and 6 as well. 
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Table 5: The lead-lag relationship between S&P and Moody’s, ordered probit models 
a) S&P as rating follower, Moody’s as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
∆ Rating by Moodys h=1  0.3389  0.2310  -0.6285   
∆ Rating by Moodys h=2  0.3979 *** 0.0026  -0.7377   
∆ Rating by Moodys h=3   0.0221   0.8739   -0.0409   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0343         
p (LR)   0.0186           
Observations   595           
b) Moodys as rating follower, S&P as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
∆ Rating by S&P h=1  0.3323  0.1921  -0.2038   
∆ Rating by S&P h=2  0.4119 *** 0.0023  -0.2527   
∆ Rating by S&P h=3   0.2163   0.1087   -0.1327   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0495         
p (LR)   0.0028           
Observations   657           





Table 6: The lead-lag relationship between Fitch and Moody’s, ordered probit models 
a) Fitch as rating follower, Moody’s as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
∆ Rating by Moodys h=1  0.4307  0.1564  -0.3131   
∆ Rating by Moodys h=2  0.5513 *** 0.0001  -0.4008   
∆ Rating by Moodys h=3   0.1091   0.4842   -0.0793   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0729         
p (LR)   0.0006           
Observations   749           
b) Moodys as rating follower, Fitch as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
∆ Rating by Fitch h=1  0.7679 *** 0.0014  -0.6068   
∆ Rating by Fitch h=2  0.3043 ** 0.0125  -0.2405   
∆ Rating by Fitch h=3   0.1629   0.2191   -0.1288   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0536         
p (LR)   0.0004           
Observations   821           




Table 7: Lead-lag relationships between S&P and Fitch in terms of upgrades and downgrades 
a) S&P as rating follower, Fitch as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
Downgrade by Fitch h=1  -0.2416  0.5917  0.3789   
Downgrade by Fitch h=2  -0.2036  0.3064  0.2328   
Downgrade by Fitch h=3   -0.5310 *** 0.0028   0.6074   
Upgrade by Fitch h=1  0.2424  0.8493  -0.2031   
Upgrade by Fitch h=2  0.2424  0.6741  -0.2053   
Upgrade by Fitch h=3   0.2340   0.5971   -0.2007   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0330         
p (LR)   0.0502           
Observations   982           
b) Fitch as rating follower, S&P as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
Downgrade by S&P h=1  -0.7715 ** 0.0210  0.9866   
Downgrade by S&P h=2  -0.4575 ** 0.0120  0.1804   
Downgrade by S&P h=3   -0.5090 *** 0.0020   0.2007   
Upgrade by S&P h=1  -1.1730 * 0.0610  2.9384   
Upgrade by S&P h=2  0.4563  0.3990  -0.0989   
Upgrade by S&P h=3   0.4405   0.3670   -0.0978   
Pseudo R-squared  0.1001         
p (LR)   0.0001           
Observations   973           
*, **, *** 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance, respectively Source: Bloomberg (2018) 
Table 7a) and 7b) report the results of the ordered probit estimation of Equations (3) and (4) respectively using 
the sovereign credit ratings of S&P and Fitch for selected African countries. The dependent variables are 
respectively  ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝑆𝑆&𝑆𝑆 and ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ referring to a SCR change by S&P (Fitch) for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 at month 𝑡𝑡. The 
different rating classes are as specified under Table 4. The independent dummy variable 𝐷𝐷_𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ (𝐷𝐷_𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ,ℎ𝑆𝑆&𝑆𝑆) 
was assigned the value of one when sovereign 𝑖𝑖 was upgraded by Fitch (S&P) and zero was used in other cases.  
For the independent dummy variable  𝐷𝐷_𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ,ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ (𝐷𝐷_𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,ℎ𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹ℎ) the value of one was assigned the value of one 
when sovereign 𝑖𝑖 was downgraded by Fitch (S&P) and zero was used in other cases.  Three time windows (ℎ) are 
specified as: ℎ = 1 for one month, ℎ = 2 for two to six months and ℎ = 3 for seven months to one year, before 
the rating upgrade or downgrade has been made by S&P (Fitch) for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 in month 𝑡𝑡. The marginal effect 
percentages (ME%) are also reported for the coefficients. The same approach was used in Tables 8 and 9. 
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Table 8: Lead-lag relationships between S&P and Moody’s in terms of upgrades and 
downgrades 
a) S&P as rating follower, Moody’s as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
Downgrade by Moodys h=1  -0.1826  0.6024  0.4003   
Downgrade by Moodys h=2  -0.5084 *** 0.0009  0.9015   
Downgrade by Moodys h=3   -0.0412   0.7997   0.0730   
Upgrade by Moodys h=1  0.2644  0.9119  -0.3404   
Upgrade by Moodys h=2  0.2644  0.7876  -0.3423   
Upgrade by Moodys h=3   0.2644   0.7052   -0.3447   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0385         
p (LR)   0.0806           
Observations   605           
b) Moodys as rating follower, S&P as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
Downgrade by S&P h=1  -0.4893  0.1354  0.5389   
Downgrade by S&P h=2  -0.5157 *** 0.0012  0.2848   
Downgrade by S&P h=3   -0.2431   0.1378   0.1342   
Upgrade by S&P h=1  0.5425  0.6286  -0.1475   
Upgrade by S&P h=2  -0.0172  0.9700  0.0097   
Upgrade by S&P h=3   0.5416   0.2888   -0.1546   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0564         
p (LR)   0.0132           
Observations   673           





Table 9: Lead-lag relationships between Fitch and Moody’s in terms of upgrades and 
downgrades 
a) Fitch as rating follower, Moody’s as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
Downgrade by Moodys h=1  -0.5816 * 0.0967  0.8879   
Downgrade by Moodys h=2  -0.6600 *** 0.0001  0.4522   
Downgrade by Moodys h=3   -0.1437   0.4160   0.0984   
Upgrade by Moodys h=1  0.1750  0.9537  -0.0940   
Upgrade by Moodys h=2  0.1750  0.8874  -0.0943   
Upgrade by Moodys h=3   0.1750   0.8421   -0.0947   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0750         
p (LR)   0.0049           
Observations   760           
b) Moodys as rating follower, Fitch as rating leader 
  Coefficients  Probability  ME%  
Downgrade by Fitch h=1  -0.7873 ** 0.0141  1.7883   
Downgrade by Fitch h=2  -0.3412 * 0.0616  0.2580   
Downgrade by Fitch h=3   -0.3432 * 0.0511   0.2596   
Upgrade by Fitch h=1  0.4225  0.8348  -0.1835   
Upgrade by Fitch h=2  1.3085 ** 0.0169  -0.2580   
Upgrade by Fitch h=3   0.4225   0.5383   -0.1879   
Pseudo R-squared  0.0576         
p (LR)   0.0035           
Observations   837           





Table 10: Herding and habit behaviour between rating agencies 
Dependent variable  DMoody's  DFitch  DMoody's  DS&P  DFitch  DS&P  
                 
Herding  0.8118 *** 0.3923  0.3193  0.5407 ** 0.3004  0.3901  
  (0.0007)  (0.1853)  (0.2104)  (0.0486)  (0.1937)  (0.2461)  
                 
Habit  -0.0023  0.5177 * 0.0255  -0.8771 *** 0.6559 ** -0.7137 *** 
    (0.9945)   (0.0806)  (0.9422)   (0.0004)  (0.0227)  (0.0041)  
                 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0294  0.0156  0.0049  0.0414  0.0192  0.0266  
p (LR)  0.0057  0.1217  0.4809  0.0015  0.0684  0.0052  
                            
N  11  11  10  10  11  11  
Observations  870  870  707  705  1082  1080  
                            
*, **, *** 10%, 5%, 1% level of significance, respectively  Data Source: Bloomberg (2018) 
Table 10 reports the results of the ordered probit estimation of Equations (6) and (7) respectively using the sovereign credit ratings of each agency for selected African countries. 
The dependent variables are respectively ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐴𝐴 and ∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗𝐵𝐵 referring to a SCR change by agency A (B) for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 at month 𝑡𝑡. The different rating classes are as specified 
under Table 4.  The independent variables refer to a rating change for sovereign 𝑖𝑖 by agency A and B in the previous month.  Herding behaviour can be identified as follows:  if 
𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 > 0 or 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 > 0, herding behaviour happens; if 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 < 0 or 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 < 0, adverse herding happens and if 𝛼𝛼2𝑖𝑖 = 0 or 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 = 0, no significant herding happens.  Habit behaviour can 
be identified as follows:  if 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 > 0 or 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 > 0, trend following happens; if 𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 < 0 or 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 < 0, contrarian rating assignment happens and if  𝛼𝛼1𝑖𝑖 = 0 or 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖 = 0, no habit 




Table 11: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for S&P and Fitch 
Dependent variable D(Fitch)  D(S&P)  
Country Herding  p Habit  p Obs Herding  p Habit  p Obs 
Angola -0.0686  0.9552 -0.0456  0.974 97 -0.0734  0.9544 -0.1106  0.9213 97 
Egypt 1.3523 ** 0.0131 -0.4745  0.5884 113 -0.2651  0.7324 0.6541  0.2551 113 
Gabon -3.3648  0.998 -3.3648  0.999 85 0.0000  0.999 -3.2079  0.994 85 
Ghana -3.4391  0.999 -3.4391  0.999 113 -3.4828  0.998 -3.4828  0.998 113 
Mozambique 0.4023 ** 0.0481 1.0969 *** 0.0025 113 -0.4696  0.4832 -1.0212 ** 0.0436 113 
Nigeria -0.2294  0.9186 -2.8836  0.997 113 -0.2224  0.9263 -0.1084  0.9267 113 
Rwanda 0.0000  1 -3.0821  0.997 78 0.0000  1 0.0000  1 78 
South Africa -3.6284  0.997 -3.5581  0.997 113 -3.6529  0.996 -3.7258  0.996 113 
Tunisia -3.7724  0.997 -3.8598  0.997 58 -3.9830  0.997 -3.8945  0.996 57 
Uganda 2.8839  0.997 -2.8839  0.997 113 2.8839  0.997 -2.8839  0.997 113 
Zambia -3.1663   0.998 -3.1663   0.998 87 -3.1663   0.998 -3.1663   0.998 87 




Table 12: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Moody's and Fitch 
Dependent variable D(Moody's) D(Fitch) 
Country Herding  p Habit  p Obs Herding  p Habit  p Obs 
Angola 1.5925 ** 0.0367 -0.0272  0.9718 97 -0.0341  0.9684 -0.0454  0.9742 97 
Egypt 1.3622 ** 0.0174 0.5681  0.3584 113 0.8101  0.1951 -0.3481  0.6894 113 
Gabon 1.2385  0.1568 -3.6985  0.994 42 -3.9456  0.997 -4.1485  0.998 42 
Ghana -3.7040  0.998 -3.7040  0.997 66 -3.5001  0.998 -3.5001  0.999 66 
Mozambique -3.7823  0.997 -3.9149  0.996 57 0.6029  0.1526 0.6696 ** 0.0461 57 
Namibia -3.0273  0.997 -3.0273  0.997 81 -3.0273  0.997 -3.0273  0.997 81 
Nigeria -3.6988  0.998 -3.6988  0.997 67 -3.4958  0.998 -3.4958  0.999 67 
South Africa -0.2262  0.8718 -0.1101  0.9256 113 -0.2753  0.8556 -3.4956  0.995 113 
Tunisia 0.9967 * 0.067 -3.5207  0.989 113 -3.6737  0.994 -3.5045  0.993 113 
Uganda 3.4092  0.998 -3.4092  0.998 54 3.4092  0.998 -3.4092  0.998 54 
Zambia -3.4712   0.997 -3.7412   0.996 67 -3.4958   0.998 -3.4958   0.999 67 





Table 13: Individual country time-series ordered probit regressions for Moody's and S&P 
Dependent variable D(Moody's) D(S&P) 
Country Herding  p Habit  p Obs Herding  p Habit  p Obs 
Angola -0.0439  0.9655 -0.0220  0.9756 97 0.8681 * 0.0923 -0.1243  0.9178 97 
Egypt 1.1627 ** 0.0275 0.6022  0.3279 113 1.1770 ** 0.0339 0.4221  0.5010 113 
Gabon Not enough obs Not enough obs 
Ghana -3.7040  0.998 -3.7040  0.998 66 -3.5001  0.998 -3.5001  0.999 66 
Mozambique 0.3785  0.4504 -4.8565  0.989 57 -0.6350  0.3299 -0.6690 *** 0.0028 57 
Nigeria -3.7597  0.989 -3.7597  0.989 67 -3.7597  0.998 -3.7597  0.998 67 
South Africa -0.2281  0.8516 -0.1110  0.925 113 1.4807 * 0.06 -3.5958  0.996 113 
Tunisia -3.8484  0.996 -4.2006  0.997 58 -4.1216  0.997 -3.7998  0.995 57 
Uganda -3.4092  0.998 -3.4092  0.998 54 -6.0319  0.999 -6.0319  0.999 54 
Zambia -3.7412   0.997 -3.7412   0.996 67 -3.4958   0.998 -3.4958   0.999 67 










Table 14: Summary of overall findings per rating agency pairs 
S&P follows Fitch Fitch follows S&P 
General pooled General pooled 
2-6 months 2-6 months 
7-12 months 7-12 months 
No clear leader or follower 
    
Up/downgrade pooled Up/downgrade pooled 
Downgrades 7 -12 months Downgrades 1, 2-6 and 7-12 months 
  Upgrades one month 
Fitch follows S&P, S&P leads Fitch 
    
Herding or habit behaviour Herding or habit behaviour 
S&P - contrarian habit behaviour Fitch - habit behaviour 
No clear leader or follower 
    
Herding or habit behaviour - individual 
countries 
Herding or habit behaviour - individual 
countries 
S&P - contrarian habit behaviour - Mozambique Fitch herds towards S&P - Egypt, Mozambique 
  Fitch - habit behaviour - Mozambique 
Fitch follows S&P, S&P leads Fitch 
    
  
S&P follows Moody's Moody's follows S&P 
General pooled General pooled 
2-6 months 2-6 months 
No clear leader or follower 
    
Up/downgrade pooled Up/downgrade pooled 
Downgrades 2-6 months Downgrades 2-6 months 
No clear leader or follower 
    
Herding or habit behaviour Herding or habit behaviour 
S&P herds towards Moody's   
S&P - contrarian habit behaviour   
S&P follows Moody's, Moody's leads S&P 
    
34 
 
Herding or habit behaviour - individual 
countries 
Herding or habit behaviour - individual 
countries 
S&P herds towards Moody's - Angola, Egypt, SA Moody's herds towards S&P - Egypt 
S&P - contrarian habit behaviour - Mozambique   
S&P follows Moody's, Moody's leads S&P 
    
  
Fitch follows Moody's Moody's follows Fitch 
General pooled General pooled 
2-6 months 1 month 
  2-6 months 
Moody's follows Fitch, Fitch leads Moody's 
    
Up/downgrade pooled Up/downgrade pooled 
Downgrades 1 and 7-12 months Downgrades 1, 2-6 and 7-12 months 
  Upgrades 2-6 months 
Moody's follows Fitch, Fitch leads Moody's 
    
Herding or habit behaviour Herding or habit behaviour 
Fitch - habit behaviour Moody's herd towards Fitch 
Moody's follows Fitch, Fitch leads Moody's 
    
Herding or habit behaviour - individual 
countries 
Herding or habit behaviour - individual 
countries 
Fitch - habit behaviour - Mozambique Moody's herds towards Fitch - Angola, Egypt, Tunisia 
Moody's follows Fitch, Fitch leads Moody's 
    










































Figure 1. Distribution of Monthly Numerical Ratings of African Sovereigns 
Data Source: Bloomberg (2018) 
